I. INTRODUCTION
The talk of the need to "reinvent" federal regulation has become common at least since the 1990s. 1 The rhetoric of reinvention has been carried along by a sense of crisis, even alarm, triggered by the recognition that, all told, "traditional"-i.e., control-andcommand 2 -regulation has turned from profit to loss. 3 Critics have faulted the traditional mode of regulation with insensitivity to the toll levied on regulated industries and society in pursuit of idealistic objectives 4 and have argued that it ran counter to participatory democratic values. 5 In reaction, in the past generation, we have been witnessing an explosion of novel regulatory strategies that seek to address these and related critiques. 6 While there is a considerable amount of literature studying the "reinvention revolution," not much attention has been given to its historical origins in the annals of regulation in the United States. This is understandable given the ubiquitous conception that the reinvention campaign has ushered in a "revolution" or a "new paradigm" of regulation.
7 This Article seeks to challenge that conception and argues that it is a severely misguided misconception. The Article harkens back to first attempts at modern stateregulation in nineteenth century U.S., and demonstrates the striking theoretical similarities between that era's foremost model of regulation and models of regulation espoused by the reinvention revolution. It is argued that in important respects contemporary regulation reverts to prior theories of regulation, rather than introducing a revolutionary chapter to the intellectual history of regulation in the United States.
Specifically, the Article revisits and offers a new interpretation of the work of the leading regulator and theoretician of regulation in post-Civil War U.S., Charles Francis Adams, Jr. (1835 -1915 . 8 Adams, a member of one of the country's most distinguished political families of the day, was truly an American aristocrat 9 -and lived as such. 10 He devoted much of his life to a study of the railroad industry at a time when its development was in full swing and the revolution that would follow on its heels loomed large, making himself "an unrivaled authority on [the railroad industry]."
11 Most pertinently, Adams is remembered as the originator of a distinct model of regulation. It was a model of "weak" regulation to be carried out by public, investigatory "sunshine" commissions. Introducing the model to the American polity was his great contribution to the practice and theory of regulation in the United States. He was the founding father and consequently the Chairman of the epoch-defining Massachusetts Board of Railroad Commissioners, which was created in 1869 by an act Adams himself authored. 12 It did not take long for the Adams model to become a truly "national prototype" of regulation.
13
The Article offers a fresh interpretation of the immense 14 Adams corpus. 15 This interpretation focuses on the hold of evolutionary thinking on Adams' work. 16 REGULATION (1984) , ch. 1; and CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 1835 -1915 (1916 [hereinafter ADAMS, AUTOBIOGRAPHY] . A son of Massachusetts, Adams was a true patriote local and wrote lengthy essays outlining ways to bolster Boston's precarious position in the national market through a reform in its transportation system. See Charles Francis Adams, Boston, 106 N. Am. Rev. 1 (1868) [hereinafter Adams, Boston I] , and Charles Francis Adams, Boston II, 106 N. AM. REV. 557 (1868) [hereinafter Adams, Boston II] . 9 Adams was the grandson of John Quincy Adams, the sixth President of the United States, whose own father, John Adams, was the second President of the Union. See PAUL C. NAGEL, DESCENT FROM GLORY: FOUR GENERATIONS OF THE JOHN ADAMS FAMILY (1983) . 10 See Adams' grandsons' description of various aspects of his daily life in Elliot Perkins et al., Three Views of Charles Francis Adams, II, 72 PROC. MASS. HIST. SOC'Y 212 (1957 -1960 . See also sources cited supra note 8.
that Adams' theory of regulation-a theory that resonates with current strategies to "reinvent" the administrative process-relies on one particular school of natural and social evolution. That school is identified in the Article as Spencerism, as it is associated with Herbert Spencer (1820 Spencer ( -1903 , the leading evolutionist thinker in the United States at the time, 17 who has been (in)famous from the late nineteenth century to this day for his robust advocacy of Social Darwinism. 18 The unique interpretation put forward in the Article presents new answers to old puzzles associated with the Adams model. Notable is the following: Adams lived and worked in an era that saw unparalleled economic growth, but also the rise of giant, alltoo-powerful monopolistic corporations, which were widely held to pose a real threat to American democracy. 19 How, then, could Adams' acrid analyses of the power of gigantic railroad corporations be reconciled with his model of weak regulation? How could they
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15
Reading this Article, one might get the wrong impression that Adams constructed a fully coherent corpus in his expansive writing through the years. Well, he did not (for he was human). Elsewhere I point to tensions in his "corpus." See Yair Sagy, The Manager, The Judge, and the Empiricist: American Administrative Law as a Theory of Expertise (2006) (unpublished JSD Dissertation, New York University) (on file with the New York University Law School Library) [hereinafter Sagy, The Manager, The Judge, and the Empiricist]. In this Article I have tried to capture the core of Adams' thinking by focusing on the themes that recur throughout his work. These themes are in many respects the center of the Article. 16 As noted, I will approach these and related questions by reading Adams through the lens of the raging nineteenth century debate about evolution, conducted by the leading evolutionists of the day, such as Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Louis Agassiz (1807-1873), Charles Darwin (1809-1882), Asa Gray (1810-1888), Thomas Henry Huxley (1825 -1895 , and Herbert Spencer (1820 Spencer ( -1903 "Social Darwinism" can be defined as "the belief that competitive struggle between individuals, tribes, nations, and races has been the chief engine of progress in social evolution." JOHN C. GREENE, Darwin as a Social Evolutionist, in SCIENCE, IDEOLOGY, AND WORLD VIEW: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EVOLUTIONARY IDEAS 95 (1981) [hereinafter GREENE, Darwin as a Social Evolutionist] . See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645, 654-655 (1985) . So viewed, Spencer, who coined the phrase "the survival of the fittest," was undoubtedly a major figure in Social Darwinist thinking. See, e.g., 1 HERBERT SPENCER, PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY 444 (1864) ("This survival of the fittest, which I have here sought to express in mechanical terms, is that which Mr. Darwin has called 'natural selection,' or 'the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life.'"). The natural inclusion of Spencerism under the heading of Social Darwinism is not to imply that Spencerism and Darwinism do not differ on substantial issues in their respective descriptions of evolutionary processes. They do. Suffice it to say that Spencerism is premised on the inheritance of acquired traits, psychological features included. Modern Darwinism rejects this idea. See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER (1986) . Finally, it should be noted that it would be a mistake to equate the theories of Charles Darwin and "Darwinism", for over the years the latter term has come to embrace a concept of evolution which is somewhat different than that of Darwin. Notably, Darwin believed in the inheritance of acquired characteristics, while his followers reject the idea. See generally PETER J. BOWLER, EVOLUTION: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (3rd ed., 2001) . 19 See infra text accompanying note 47. [Vol. xx:xxx be reconciled with his endorsement of business "combinations" and even monopolies? 20 Moreover, if, as Adams argued, a regulatory commission's sole role was to objectively inform the public and the railroads of the state of the industry, would it not be more appropriate to assign expert professionals (for example, lawyers, engineers, etc.) for the job? After all, this was also "the era of the professional." 21 The following discussion will demonstrate how the controversy concerning evolution in general, and Spencer in particular, provided Adams with intellectual toolsconcepts, understanding of natural and social processes, and even metaphors-with which to analyze issues concerning public regulation of the railroad industry. 22 Accordingly, evolutionary thinking provides us with a "conceptual map"
23 that renders Adams' model "reasonable" or "complete." 24 Exposing the imprint of Spencerism and Social Darwinism in Adams' seminal theory of regulation and connecting this theory to present models of regulation, the Article unearths and explores the key theoretical foundations of much contemporary thinking and practice in the field of administrative regulation. Therefore, the Article makes an important contribution to the literature in three ways. First, it offers an original interpretation of the theories of Adams, rightly considered one of the few "prophets of regulation" in the history of the United States. 25 Second, it uncovers the influence evolutionary thinking had on the rise of the American administrative state and explores the school of evolution that was most influential at the time (i.e., Spencerism). And third, in connecting Adams to the present, it sheds a new light on current so-called revolutionary models of regulation and exposes their deep intellectual ties to modern evolutionary thinking. In so doing, the Article reveals the long-lasting legacy of Social Darwinism in the history and theory of regulation in the United Sates-a legacy that persists to this day. Consequently, the Article contributes to debates about contemporary models of regulation by providing a fuller understanding of their theoretical foundations.
________________________________________________________________________
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See infra Section II.D. 21 See infra notes 162-163 and accompanying text. 22 It is already worth emphasizing here that in putting forward a Spencerian interpretation of the Adams corpus I do not mean to suggest that the two thinkers were necessarily of one mind with respect to every aspect of railroad (and other) regulation. See, e.g., infra note 59 for an example of how Adams and Spencer differed on the question of railroad regulation. Nor am I suggesting that Spencer et al., and they alone, could account for all of the details in Adams' theories and their contemporary progeny, nor that Adams' approach to regulation incorporated every detail of Spencerism. Rather, evolutionary thinking is brought forward as a useful and instructive frame of thought that was much in vogue in late-nineteenthcentury U.S., in light of which Adams' model "made sense." Ultimately, my argument is that Adams and Spencer shared similar (evolutionary) principles, and that these principles tell us something important about Adams' own and Adams-like models of regulation. 23 See STEVEN LUKES, POWER A RADICAL VIEW 15 (2d ed., 2005) . 24 An analogy to Ronald Dworkin's known method of "constructive interpretation" may, perhaps, be suggested here. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 52 (1986) (constructive interpretation imposes "purpose on an object or practice in order to make it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong."). 25 See MCCRAW, supra note 8.
The Article proceeds as follows. The next part, Part II, will thrash out Adams' model of regulation. It will first introduce his age and put his model in the context 26 of the advent of mammoth, national corporations in the U.S. economy. Further, it will examine Adam's relevant legal context by pointing at alternative means available at the time to tame unruly behavior of railroads (e.g., legislation, or trust-busting). The Part will also canvass the Adams model of regulation, following an analysis of Adams' unique conceptualization of "the Railroad Problem," that is, his understanding of the challenge faced by the American polity with the rise of monopolistic railroads.
Part III will turn to the intellectual context of Adams' work. Specifically, the Part will focus on the debate on evolution raging at the time. As we shall see, "evolution" has never been a settled concept. This complexity raises the following questions: What was "evolution" for Adams? What were its lessons? What does Adam's interpretation of evolution tell us about his theory of regulation? Part III will address these questions, showing that the teachings of Spencer left the clearest marks on Adams' thinking.
Part IV will illustrate the ways Adams' model of regulation followed Spencer's principles, while Part V will connect Adams' work to the present by highlighting the similarities between his model of regulation and current attempts to "reinvent" regulation.
Finally, Part VI will conclude.
II. ON RAILROAD REGULATION: ADAMS' AGE AND WORK
A. A Muckraker in Context
Adams immersed himself in the study of railroads in the years following the Civil War, 27 an era that went down in history as the Gilded Age. 28 In this era the American economy underwent a major transformation that was spurred by massive urbanization 29 and phenomenal expansion of the railroad industry. 30 During the years between the Civil
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See infra note 206 (on contextual historiography). As noted by Richard Hofstadter, in this era it became clear that " [t] he United States was born in the country," yet it "has moved to the city." RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYANT TO F.D. R. 23 (1955) [hereinafter HOFSTADTER, AGE OF REFORM]. Urbanization was also a result of the "immigration invasion," which brought about "a breakdown in the relative homogeny of the [American] population," which had been "down to about 1880 … not only rural but also Yankee and Protestant in its basic notions." Id. at 8.
30
See generally JOHN F. STOVER, AMERICAN RAILROADS 1-166 (2d ed., 1997). Indeed, railroad expansion was so dramatic that it seemed to Adams (in 1875) that ". . . railroads were constructed as if by magic." Yet Adams was quick to add that some "lines were laid out from points where no one lived to points were no one wanted to go." Charles Francis Adams, The Granger Movement, 120 N. AM. REV. 394, War and World War I, the annual value of products manufactured in the United States increased nearly seventeen times, and the railroad network increased eightfold, practically covering the entire land. 31 This intense economic activity was the handiwork of a new kind of business organization. Once run by individuals or relatively small businesses, by mid-century, major markets were dominated by sizeable corporations.
32
Countless Americans were startled by the rise of large-scale corporations; some were even frightened. As John Tipple aptly writes, " [B] y sheer magnitude the large industrial corporation overshadowed the society around it." 33 A great many Americans thought that the big, national corporation was based on premises alien to the American credo. So much so, that Tipple goes on to remark that "the large industrial corporation was an anomaly in nineteenth-century America; there was no place for it among existing institutions and no sanction for it in traditional American values."
34
The American economic landscape was transformed not only by the advent of a new kind of business organization-the mammoth, national corporation-but also by its aggressive business mores. For, big as they had grown to be, countless corporations were still faced with fierce competition, which frequently turned into "competition run mad."
35
In particular, alarmed observers were concerned about brutal competitive strategies employed by rivaling railroad corporations. These strategies included the lowering of rates to unprofitable levels at the expense of public safety, secretive rebates, and discrimination against entire communities.
36
What drew particular attention was the plethora of trusts (or "combinations") among various firms, which every so often led to the formation of monopolies. 37 
37
"Trust"-as well as "combination," a popular term in the late nineteenth century-is a confusing term, which may encompass various business strategies whereby different corporations joined forces to better their standing in the market. More specifically, it may relate to "pooling" (cartels and other forms of coordination among firms) and/or various forms of merger among firms, possibly to the point of forming a monopoly. Compare MCCRAW, supra note 8, at 65 (referring to the turn-of-the-century "trust movement" as "the powerful tendency of businessmen to combine with their competitors in associations and mergers.") with RICHARD T. ELY, MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS (1900), e.g., at 217 ("trust" as "industrial concentration"). For a recent review of the difficulties in the late nineteenth century to conceptualize such business strategies, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309 , 2328 -2335 (1995 . faced "predatory competition," 38 corporations repeatedly chose to join forces and even merge with their competitors.
39 "In New York," noted Adams in 1868, "everything now tends to consolidation, and consolidation in the hands of able men portends as assured a success as does the massing of troops under brilliant generals in war."
40
The run for bigness in general, and the formation of combinations in particular, did not mix well with the ubiquitous commitment to and the belief in the merits of open, monopoly-free competition among enterprising "local entrepreneur[s]". 41 Here was a place where the dangers to the average American posed by "the new giantism in the American economy" 42 became most salient. This was "a life-or-death struggle," 43 -a struggle (allegedly) waged by corporations against the American citizenry; indeed, against American democracy.
Adams was well aware of all these economic developments and wrote about them profusely throughout his adult life. In fact, he first emerged on the public scene as a muckraker. 44 Adams published a long series of articles analyzing the evils inflicted both on the public at large and on railroad lines due to unbridled, dishonest management and pressures of savage competition, so common in the industry of the time. 45 His A Chapter of Erie (1869) in particular was and still is considered a masterpiece of muckraker literature. It was characterized as a study "of moral disintegration in the heart of a great nation." 46 Referring to Cornelius ("Commodore") Vanderbilt as one of the railroad industry's "Titans," Adams wrote in A Chapter that in his "path of centralization" Vanderbilt "has introduced Caesarism into corporate life." Adams went on to prophesize ominously, "The individual will hereafter be engrafted on the corporation,-democracy running its course, and resulting in imperialism; and Vanderbilt is but the precursor of a class of people who will wield within the State a power created by the State, but too great for its control."
47 Surprisingly, Adams' proposal to cure the predicament imposed by anti-competitive practices of railroad magnates was not to curtail railroads' combinations. Rather, convinced that "[c]ombinations of capital and labor which amount to monopolies can alone satisfy the present enormous requirements of modern society," 48 he chose a different route. Adams thought that the introduction of public "advisory bodies" was the right vehicle to check railroads' malevolent behavior, for they "might scientifically study and disclose to an astonished community . . . the remedies no less than the causes of obstructions."
49
In his work, Adams lays the first principles, or natural laws, of the transportation revolution, 50 principles that explain the past and augur the future. 51 Adams' survey of the railroad system of his day begins with the understanding that railroads have played havoc with the "old New England[]": "The revolutions of these few years," he wrote in 1867 of the previous twenty years, "have swept away the last vestiges of colonial thoughts and persons." 52 As much as Adams' style was hyperbolic at times, his analysis was often truly prescient. He relentlessly hammered into his readers' minds the profound, irreversible influence steam transportation had and would surely have on their lives. As previously remote localities drew close with the coming of railways, a one-directional movement was certain to evolve; a movement that would sweep food and commodities, men and nations, ideas and artifacts: "The tendency of steam has universally been towards the gravitation to the center,-toward combination and concentration of forces, whether intellectual or physical." 53 Yet, to Adams, there would be a dark side to the pull of human centralization propelled by railroads-for, it was responsible for moral corrosion. In one of the most elitist samples of his writing, Adams proclaimed that the increase in trade resulted in "those portentous accumulations of the evil humors of society which men call railroad centres," and warned that "[a]lready [steam] has accumulated a populace in the city of New York, in whose hands the principle of self-government has become a confessed failure." 55 Reading Adams reveals that in his eyes he was engaged in a missionary cause. Adams the muckraker was sorrowed and driven to action by "the deep decay which has eaten into our social edifice."
56 It is for this reason that he did not put much stock in legislative remedies offered in vauco, that is to say, on measures not backed by a committed public. 57 Adams' various publications were set to bring about public awakening. A credible exposure of the far-ranging repercussions of, and interests involved in the spread of railways around the globe constituted the first stop on his mission: Before any action could be taken with regard to the railroad problem, "the first preliminary is to induce the community to realize the true magnitude of the question involved." 58 Adams' weak regulation was designed to do exactly that.
Having introduced Adams' age, I now move to introduce the legal background against which he worked. The main idea behind the legal context canvassed in the following Section is to make clear that Adams had several (legal) options available to him, as he reflected on ways to regulate railroad corporations.
A. Legal Context
It would be wrong to assume that Adams analyzed the state of the railroad industry against a lawless background in which railroads were allowed to do as they pleased. That was not the case. Actually, several options presented themselves at the time. ________________________________________________________________________ Prevention of Railroad Strikes] . This last article was written when Adams was still the president of the Union Pacific. This did not prevent him from putting forward a progressive scheme of regulating employeremployee relations in the railway industry that, among other things, would assure employees a voice in the management of the various railroads. "It is well to reform the currency, it is well to enact laws against malefactors; but neither the one nor the other will restore health to a business community which tolerates successful fraud, or which honors wealth more than honesty." Rather, " [t] In the nineteen-century railroad corporations could be-and were-brought to court under a common-law cause of action. 59 Yet with the passage of time, it became clear, at least to progressives, that courts were inept to handle the enormous challenges brought about by the economic transformation of the nineteenth century. 60 Next, railroad corporations were the creations of legislative charters that determined their powers and liabilities. 61 As in other cases, such charters were issued under the common understanding that "corporations were not immune from the general functioning of state police power-the legislature's ongoing ability to enact regulations for public safety, morals, health, and welfare."
62 Given this structure of charters and legislation, state governments were steeped in the inner operation of the railroad business from the outset. As pointed out by Adams, state legislators were repeatedly called upon to issue charters or other forms of private legislation. "It is scarcely an exaggeration to say," he maintained in 1871, "that our legislatures are now universally becoming a species of irregular boards of railroad direction."
63
Turning to Adams' home state, it should be noted that years before 1869 (when Adams' legislation went on the books) 64 the Massachusetts legislature had ratified a comprehensive piece of legislation that dealt with varied related issues, such as the corporate and finance sides in railroad management (their organization and capital), the construction and maintenance of roads and the taking of lands for that end, and liability for damages associated with railroad operation. 65 The legislature also stipulated that railroads were obliged to submit a detailed annual report canvassing every conceivable aspect of their day-to-day business to the Secretary of the Commonwealth; failure to
________________________________________________________________________
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It was well established in the common law already in the early nineteenth century that "common carriers" were normally obliged, unlike most other businesses, to serve pretty much every client knocking at their door. AMERICAN LAW 1836 -1937 125-127 (1991 . 64 See infra text accompanying notes 113-120. comply carried a monetary penalty. 66 Lastly, the said legislation even broached the sensitive subject of the tolls that the railroad corporations were to collect from their patrons. It authorized the legislature to "alter or reduce" the railroad rates, but set a cap on such intervention.
67
A separate issue was, of course, the question of whether the law "on the books" was also the prevailing "law in action," namely, were the comprehensive legislation and constraining charters actually enforced by the state? It seems that, generally, this was seldom the case.
68 But, as we shall now see, 69 for Adams, the solution to the railroad problem could not in any event be found in the halls of the legislature.
Up to this point, we have addressed the options of taming the railroads without taking into consideration their anti-competitive practices. However, as noted, such practices were common throughout the American economy, certainly in the railroad business. The hardship inflicted by the merger and trust movements 70 on many sectors of the economy could be (at least, theoretically) curtailed in more ways than one. There were other options to those mentioned here: First, there was the option of a laissezfaire regime of some sort. However, "[r]uinous competition" among railroads in particular illustrated to all the dangers involved in "a sublime faith in laissez-faire," as Adams put it. Adams, The Railroad System, supra note 48, at 501. Next, governmental management (even without ownership) of the industry was yet another option. Adams' opposition in this regard rested again on Progressives' fear of "eager and corrupt[] [politicians] ." Id. at 508, 509. (Adams' opposition hit a promising vein of public sentiment, as was demonstrated by the fact that it took the United States the outbreak of world wars, decades after he had written these lines, to put government oversight into practice (See Rabin, supra note 60, at 1236-1240, and STOVER, supra note 30, at 167-191)). Third, substantial taxes could have been levied on corporations as a way of reimbursing, as it were, the community for its losses. See ELY, supra note 37, at 256-257, and Winerman, supra note 39, at 82. But see Jeremiah W. Jenks, Capitalistic Monopolies and Their Relation to the State, 9 POL. SCI. Q 486, 508 (1894) (opposing taxation of monopolies). However, as Michael McGerr comments, at the time "Americans were not yet willing to endorse taxes large enough to make a big business small," as was made clear by the minimalist first corporate tax, adopted by Congress in 1909. MCGERR, supra note 32, at 154.
72
Several notable American economists in principle favored this option, at least when it came to "natural monopolies": see ELY, supra note 37, at 180-216 and Jenks, supra note 71, at 505 ("natural monopolies . . . must be either owned by the public, or strictly controlled by some public agent."). against a wall of opposition.
73 Furthermore, typical of the Progressive Era, Adams the muckraker fulminated against what he saw as the dire state of politics at the time and was always suspicious of politicians. 74 This suspicion informed his rejection of the state ownership solution, which had been tried on the Continent. 75 State-run-that is, politician-run, as Adams saw it-railroads was anathema to him. But there is something deeper at play here than merely Adams' dislike of politicians. The option of state ownership did not sit well with his clear penchant for small government 76 and, even more so, with his concerns about the distributive consequences of big(ger) government. 77 In 1870 he stated that the government "was to confine itself to its simple functions, chief among which was provision for external defence and internal order, while for all else it accepted a policy expressed in the two forcible words, 'Hands off!'" 78 Similar sentiments informed Adams' reaction to the option of supplanting existing legislation with additional legislative strictures to further competition in the market and more aggressively check railroads' unsavory behavior. Moreover, to Adams, legislation, even if it were to be enforced, was too crude an instrument to regulate such a complex enterprise as railroads. 79 And in any event, Adams feared legislators' populist tendencies.
80
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Henry Seager called this option, "government ownership and operation, or state socialism." (emphasis in original). Henry R. Seager, The New Anti-Trust Acts, 30 POL. SCI. Q. 448, 448 (1915) . See also ADAMS, RAILROADS, supra note 35, at 198-199. 74 On the state of American politics in the years following the Civil War and reformers who tried to mend its ways, see generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 219-231 (1989 [1948 
77
Adams strongly criticized the common practice of towns, cities, and states pledging their credit in the service of railroad construction, as a part of a veritable "railroad mania." Charles Francis Adams, Town Follies, NATION, Feb. 17, 1870 , at 101. For Adams, this amounted to "the meddling of Government in matters which are none of its concern-the substituting the voice of the majority for the hard, calculating instinct of the moneyed man-the interference . . . with the law of supply and demand." Id. As suggested in this last sentence, Adams was indeed concerned by the distributive consequences of the "town follies" that had led to the generous aid offered by the public to special (railroad) interests. "If Government must meddle . . . if it will take from me and give to another, then the rule here found good as regards railroads would be found good as regards all things else," is the way he put it (id. emphasis added). He therefore insisted "that a two-thirds affirmative vote is the least protection which the public safety requires." Id.
78
Id. id.
79
In 1871 Adams would lay down "a principle that no general law can be framed which will meet the exigencies of a whole railroad system in all its manifold details." Adams, The Government and the As we know, aggressive trust-busting would be much in vogue in the post-Civil War United States.
81 To many, the economic and legal landscapes of the time, which were discussed above, seemed to demand it. But, although fully aware of the danger that lay in leaving railroad monopolies untamed, Adams took exception to the rule against monopolies in this case. 82 In fact, as noted, Adams actually advocated their preservation under a regime of weak regulation.
83 I have referred to this tension in Adams' theory of regulation as a great puzzle. It is high time we address it squarely. As we shall now see, I believe it is resolved by Adams' understanding of "the Railroad Problem."
B. The Railroad Problem
Adams devoted much of his time to elucidating and elaborating "the Railroad Problem." His conceptualization of "the Problem" was based on (1) a particular understanding of economic competition (2) a conviction of the inevitability of the monopolization of the railroad industry; and (3) a realization of the acute threat posed to American democracy by the monopolization of an industry as central as the railroads. The following discussion will address each of these points in turn.
First, on the nature of competition: To Adams, competition was (a) the rule of nature; (b) critical for the betterment of society-he believed that the natural process of competition resulted in the survival of the fittest; 84 and (c) was beyond the rule of man. The three emphases were stated, for example, in Adams' testimony to the Cullom Committee, 85 where he spoke of the "the uncontrolled law of competition," and said: "I do not think competition can be controlled by human law. I think it quite beyond it." See, e.g., Adams, "Pooling" of Railroad Receipts, supra note 45. 83 See infra text accompanying notes 104-106. 84 See infra note 86.
85
"The Cullom Committee" was the Senate Select Committee to Investigate Interstate Commerce, chaired by Senator Shelby M. Cullom. It was a five-member committee chosen in 1885 to comprehensively investigate the railroad problems. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 74, at 146-147. Founded by a Senate resolution passed on March 17, 1885, it filed its report on January 18, 1886, which Next, on the inevitable monopolization of railroad lines: Adams proclaimed in 1867 that now " [e] verything is done on a grand scale and by intricate machinery, so that competition, theoretically free, is practically impossible." 87 This rule, he emphasized, applied all the more to the railroad industry. Adams was the great commentator on the effects of economies of scale on the railroad business. 88 He succinctly observed in 1870 that "competition and the cheapest possible transportation are wholly incompatible."
89
That being the case, "while the result of other and ordinary competition was to reduce and equalize prices, that of railroad competition was to produce local inequalities and to arbitrarily raise or depress prices."
90 Accordingly, Adams proclaimed publicly that he did not "object at all" to the prospects that a single American railroad company would have emerged if open competition among railroads had been allowed to take place. 91 Indeed, he went so far as to say, "I am not prepared to say that such a result would work any evil."
92
The third, last, element in "the Problem" was the conviction that the monopolization of the railroad industry posed a real danger to American democracy. As we have seen, as a muckraker Adams published a series of influential articles reiterating this message.
93
Why is Adams' conceptualization of "the Problem" important? For it reveals that, in his mind, "the Railroad Problem" was the outcome of a colossal collision between two orders: the economic v. the republican-democratic. It was likewise the result of a clash between an emerging, innovative, and energetic new order on the one hand, and a traditional, generation-old order on the other; between an all-encompassing order and a limited one. It was a battle between an order driven by centripetal, centralizing forces and a diffused order of checks and balances, where force is divided.
This dichotomy calls for two observations: First, notice that under this binary conceptualization, the two orders are separate from each other: one is the private sphere of the economic market and the other is the public sphere of the state. This is the familiar Cullom Committee Rep., Test. P. 1208. Adams went on to comment on various British legislative attempts to regulate the railroad industry in the following manner: "The natural process has gone in spite of legislation, working by its own laws," resulting in the "survival of the fittest; that is, the strongest and best managed corporation gradually controls the territory." Id. at 1209. On British experimentation in that field in Adams' time, see, e.g., Charles F. Adams public/private division, whose fallacies were exposed by observant legal realists in the generation following Adams'. 94 Second, and more important in the present discussion, it should be noted that to Adams, the two orders were not only distinct from each other, but actually in conflict; a conflict whose outcome was clear. Namely, the economic forces at play were certain to vanquish the republic. Adams observed that the administrative apparatus of his time was not able to dismantle the immense challenges that had been foisted on the American people and its government by industrialization and the introduction of railroads. Due to the fact that "[a]t the time the framework of our government was put together, a system of necessary monopolies was the very last thing which was expected to present itself on this continent [,] . . . [a]t present" he wrote in 1871, "our government occupies the impossible position of a wooden liner exposed to the fire of modern artillery."
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What made the government so inept at regulating railroads was its inferior organization. In 1870, while still a young Commissioner in Massachusetts, Adams opined that "consolidation of . . . roads was the result of a natural law . . . [which] is the law of gravitation[]"and the outcome of that consolidation was "a more elaborate and perfect organization." 96 What's more, the emerging organization was comprised of several (railroad) corporations, each of which was "[t]his superb, effective organism, the last development of modern society . . . ." 97 Corporations, and by extrapolation their consolidation, were so perfect thanks to their unitary, disciplined organization. 98 Contrarily, the representative republican state was a feeble, decentralized entity, "adapted to a simple and somewhat undeveloped phase of society . . . ."
99 It was a state imperiled by "the difficulty of concentrating as one force all possible forms of mind and phases of interest." 100 Therefore, to Adams, it was "a sad fact" that "government has not an equal chance" in a conflict with the corporations.
101 Indeed, he went so far as to argue that several States were "owned by corporations within their limits."
102 As we have seen, this conclusion truly frightened Adams. 
C. What to Do? The Adams Model
Having identified the problem-for the railroads to work best in the public interest they had to be monopolistic and exert monopolistic powers-Adams makes the case that a novel state-instrument be deployed to deal with it and proposes the idea of regulatory commissions. Concurrently, he advocates the cultivation of monopolies. I will begin with the second element.
As we have seen, Adams did not believe that open competition held the key to regulating the railroad market. In fact, Adams went so far as to argue that the state should legalize railroad associations: "A confederation, or even a general combination among all railroad corporations having some degree of binding force, might, therefore, . . . not improbably prove the first step in the direction of a better and more stable order of things." He asserted that this should be done under three conditions: "[I]t must be legal; it must be public; it must be responsible."
104 And he made clear that the government should stay as much as possible out of the dealings of such confederations. "The confederation," he contended, "would be a responsible one, with power to enforce its own decisions upon its own members."
105 Accordingly, Adams beseeched Congress to "legalize pooling, and impose a heavy penalty on any violation of pooling agreement."
106
What should the state do apart from legalizing monopolies? Adams' main recommendation was to create "in the various States[] . . . bureaus of railroad statistics," which would work "under the superintendence of competent commissioners."
107 They "should be permanent," 108 and, Adams further clarified, would "collect information from all civilized countries," as well as from railroad corporations.
109 Speaking of the difficulties of Boston, which was then falling from favor as a leading commercial hub, he held that "some scientific direction can alone save the day."
110 The tools to infuse the scientific perspective to the democratic discourse were " [c] great railroad system is to be allowed to develop, subject only to its natural laws-to combine, to consolidate, to monopolize."). For a similar approach, see Jenks, supra note 71, e.g., at 504 ("These capitalistic monopolies involve too much that is good and beneficial to society to make it advisable to abolish them."). See also Clark, supra note 38 (holding a similar position with respect to trusts).
As noted, in 1869 Adams saw his suggestions put into law. 112 The Act to Establish a Board of Railroad Commissioners, 113 which he had drafted, ordered the governor to appoint three "competent" Board members and a salaried clerk. 114 These Commissioners should have no conflict of interest. Competent as the Commissioners might have been, the Act allowed them to employ ad-hoc "experts, or other agents . . . ."
115 This was all the Act had to say about the Board's bureaucracy.
The Act further provides that the three Commissioners shall generally supervise the railroads, "examine" them, and "keep themselves informed" as to their compliance with the law and "the security and accommodation . . . [they offer to] the public."
116 The Board, if it sees fit, may inform the railroads of their failures to comply with the law; suggest repairs or any other modification to their modus operandi; and recommend changes in their rates. Such steps should be included in the Board's annual report to the legislature. 117 The railroads, on their part, are required to furnish the Board with all pertinent information; 118 they should also inform the Board of any accident involving personal injury or loss of life; 119 and finally, the railroads bear the Commission's expenses.
120
Timid as this measure was, it did contain the core of Adams' theory of regulation. First, it was based on the realization that the democratic machinery as it then operated was ill-equipped to tackle the immense challenges of industrialization, 121 and that the introduction of a new state organ to the governmental apparatus was of the much-needed remedy to the predicament. (A different issue concerned, of course, that organ's deign and powers.) Second, the proposal captured Adams' fervent confidence in the absolute necessity of an orderly collection of information as a prerequisite to beneficial regulation. To him, information was the key to success. Early on in his career as a public commentator, Adams argued that the monopolization of industry was intimately connected to "the suppression of free discussion" and must lead to the demise of democracy. 122 Adams shared this insight with his readers in a pre-Civil War article in which he criticized the Southerners' sole reliance on the cotton industry ("King Cotton"). Adams, King Cotton, supra note 45, at 455. [Vol. xx:xxx monopoly of the cotton-culture" in the South was based on the cultivation of ignorance among the poor whites 123 who were thus unaware of the fact that "the whole tendency of the Cotton monopoly [was] to blight all branches of industry in the Cotton States save only that one."
124 His appraisal of capitalist Southerners was succinct and clear: "They are seeking to found a great and prosperous republic on the cultivation of a single staple product, and not on intelligence universally diffused: consequently they have founded their house upon the sand. Among them, cotton, and not knowledge, is power."
125 Heed well the connection made here between the suppression of knowledge and the cultivation of a single line of business. Now, once Adams came to endorse-to him, of necessityrailroad monopolies, he must have felt the need to complement this endorsement with a means of public education about railroad. Therefore, the spread of information was vital in his schema.
Third, Adams insisted that the Massachusetts Board members would be left "[w]ithout remedial or coercive powers."
126 As he stated in 1885, reflecting on the Massachusetts Railroad Board of his design when he appeared before the Cullom Committee, 127 "I attribute the success we met with to the fact that our only organs of agitation were investigation, publicity, and public opinion."
128 Among other things, Adams thought this strategy of regulation would create the conditions necessary for the Board to command the trust of all sides to a controversy, including that of the railroads, of course. He took pride in the fact that "the railroad corporations have never appeared in opposition to [the Board] as a body."
129 This is not surprising given the fact that, according to Chairman Adams' own account, he and his colleagues were "under the necessity of cultivating friendly relations with the railroad officials." 130 Finally, a quite specific image of the regulator emerges from the various elements of the Adams model. In Adams' world, the regulator should merely facilitate or, at most, orchestrate public action.
131 Indeed, it is for the public to decide what to do in the face of
Adams depicted the white "master-class" of the South as constructed of "two great opposing orders of society [:] . . . the capitalist owning the labor of a thousand slaves, and . . . the laboring white unable, under the destructive influence of profitable monopoly, to make any use of that labor which is his only property." Id. at 455. Although Adams does treat the black slaves in this article, they are not the focal point of his discussion. On the one hand, according to Adams, the slaves, too, are the victims of the whiteelite's policy of ignorance. Yet, on the other hand, Adams says this of the black slaves of the South: "Fit for freedom at present they are not, . a social challenge and it is the public at large who should effect that decision. The regulator only takes the necessary steps to enable the public to knowingly debate the social issues of the day.
132 She is a mere promoter of public debate that might lead to grassroots regulatory initiatives. Elsewhere I have demonstrated how different Adams' regulator is from that of the New Dealers, who expected commissioners to manage and direct actively the operation of whole industries. 133 Adams, who favored a minimalist government, would have none of that.
134
III. INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT: NATURAL AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION
Having canvassed the essentials of Adams' approach to regulation, I wish to offer a particular interpretation of key elements in the extensive body of literature he produced. As noted, I suggest we read it through the prism of dominant modern theories of evolution.
By all accounts, theories of evolution were all the rage among the American intelligentsia when Adams concerned himself with the railroads.
135 But "evolution" had always been a protean concept. Different scientists explained organic and inorganic evolutionary processes differently, and assessments of its social ramifications varied greatly. This Part is dedicated to a cursory mapping of some of the dominant renditions of evolution available to Adams (and his generation) to choose from as he conceptualized the railroad problem. It focuses on those versions of evolution that pervaded the intellectual atmosphere in the North-East during the Gilded Age.
A. On Natural and Other Evolutions: Introduction
Modern ideas about the transformation of human society over time surfaced in tandem with comparable ideas in biology.
136 Both doctrines drew on the growing body of geological, paleontological, and ethnological findings pointing at the antiquity of planet Earth in general, and of floral, animal, and human life on earth in particular. While geologists and biologists unearthed the planet's natural history and exposed evidence of the unimaginable diversity of past (and present) forms of life, colonialism brought the
See, e.g., Adams, Boston II, supra note 8, at 591 ("What is now asked for is discussion."). EVOLUTIONARY IDEAS 60, 60 (1981) [hereinafter GREENE, Comte and Spencer] ("The first truly evolutionary speculations in modern social theory appeared at approximately the same time as the first transformist ideas in biology.").
West in contact with "primitive" forms of human behavior and organization in America, Australia, and Africa.
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Taking a panoramic view, by the nineteenth century it seemed to scientists from different fields that nature had the tendency to develop or "progress," rather than to be fixated as had been the received wisdom for ages. 138 It has now become clear to many that just as the Earth became cooler and more habitable (and ultimately, more hospitable to human existence) with the progression of time, animals honed their adaptive skills and humans became more sophisticated in their thinking and organization.
139
Following the highly anticipated publication of Darwin's The Origin of Species in 1859, 140 it became clear that, whereas the time was indeed ripe for the idea of evolution, "natural selection"-nature's mechanism of development according to Darwin-would prove to be a much harder sell.
141 No doubt, the theory of natural selection put forward an unpalatable picture of nature torn by a constant struggle for survival; a struggle whose outcomes are randomly dictated.
142 Fully developed, Darwinism rejects the theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, which is associated with the French naturalist Jean Baptist Lamarck.
143 Importantly, chance plays a much smaller role in evolution under Lamarck's theory, where it is species' attempts to better adapt itself to its environment that determines (at least in part) its ultimate survival. Not so in Darwinism.
Contrary to Darwinism's naturalistic, "materialistic" description of evolution, several naturalists adhered to one form or another of "natural theology," which included "unnatural" elements (e.g., God) in its descriptions of natural processes, well into the nineteenth century. Notably, the highly respected naturalist Louis Agassiz, who came to According to Darwin, there is nothing intrinsically superior in the individual that survives. It is the creative power of sexual reproduction that is responsible for what in hindsight proves to be superior adaptation. He also spoke of "sexual selection," namely, cases where "individuals make a higher genetic contribution to the next generation not by having superior survival attributes but merely by being more successful in reproduction." MAYR, ONE LONG ARGUMENT, supra note 138, at 88. As we know, many found this line of argument hard to swallow: it ran counter to established convictions that nature was purposeful, namely, the comforting certainty that "the world must have a purpose because, as Aristotle had said, 'Nature does nothing in vain,' and neither, a Christian would say, does God." MAYR, supra, at 50. Comte's distinctly evolutionary account of human intellectual history was not unique at the time. 148 What was exceptional about Comte was his distinct treatment of humans' changing understanding of the universe around them. He famously posited that "the progress of thought,"
149 or "philosophizing" 150 had been going through three stages: theological (natural phenomena are held to be-immediately or ultimately-governed by a supernatural entity or entities); metaphysical (explanation for natural phenomena should be sought in some quality or force that resides in nature itself); and positive ("The law of
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Id. at 251, 268. Interestingly, Gray was a devout Christian, who believed that God had wonderfully devised a world that had the potency of evolving. See id. The trajectory charted by Comte is progressive for it advanced the human race's mastery of nature, thus allowing it to bootstrap itself from many of the miseries afflicting its natural existence. MILL, supra note 147, at 5. Mill's interpretation of Comte claims that positivism facilitates the adoption of utilitarian social thinking. See id. at 31 ("All theories in which the ultimate standard of institutions and rules of action was the happiness of mankind, and observation and experience the guides . . . , are entitled to the name Positive.").
150
MILL, supra note 147, at 5, 6. Famously, Comte analyzes the various sciences in terms of their degree of development. The order of sciences, according to Comte, is: Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology ("Physiology"), and Sociology ("Social Physics").
152 This scale is organized from the abstract to the concrete, in the sense that the former had first to mature-that is, go through the three phases of development-to allow for the development of the latter. 153 Comte accordingly believes that the remnants of theological and metaphysical thinking are still to be found in biology and even more so in sociology. His professed ambition was to bring sociology to maturity, thus rendering all human thought positive.
154
To Comte, the hierarchy among sciences reflects their subject matter's increasing complexity and the corresponding difficulty in explaining phenomena relevant to each science.
155 That the science of society is the most complex of sciences for Comte is not surprising given his aspiration to salvage-that is, to convert into positivism-all theological and metaphysical thinking about society, which encompasses not only "proper" political theories but also morality and ethics.
156 Note well that in making it his aspiration to "convert" the science of society, thus perceived, into positivism, Comte is making the case that contentious social questions could be answered positively by a sociologist, that is, in an objective, scientific manner-just as a chemist, for example, would answer questions in chemistry, for example.
157
Well, why was Mill so troubled by Comte's theory? On reviewing Comte, Mill was quick to realize the political implications of Comte's evolutionary historiography.
158 Not that Comte shied away from spelling out the operative organizational outcomes of his analysis. He unabashedly called for the establishment of centralized "Spiritual Power," to be charged with moral and intellectual guidance of citizens as well as with their education; he held that the Spiritual Power's "judgments on all matters of high moment should serve, and receive, the same universal respect and deference which is paid to the
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Id. at 5. Typical to evolutionary thinking, Comte emphasizes the essential role played by the two earlier modes of thinking in the advancement of human thinking. Moreover, nowhere does he claim that these two were completely elbowed out by Positivism. As pointed out by Mill, some of Comte's classifications of "theological" and "metaphysical" social theories may be disputed. Still, Mill does accept Comte's general argument that the field had been dominated by these two "schools." Examples of theological and metaphysical political thinking are the theory of a ruler's divine right to rule and the conception of natural rights, respectively. MILL, supra note 147, at 30-33. 157 See supra text accompanying note 152. 158 See MILL, supra note 147, at 33-44. united judgment of astronomers in matter astronomical."
159 Moreover, Comte thought that an increase in social control would be called for along the way to counteract the gradual disintegration of traditional social bonds. 160 To Mill all this sounded like a recipe for a nightmarish "spiritual despotism." 161 Mill's concern must have resonated well with Adams. The post-bellum American industrial revolution accelerated an on-going process of professionalization. Thomas Haskell makes the case that, in that tumultuous period, "one's familiar milieu and its institutions were drained of casual potency."
162 Consequently, a new breeds of expertsthe new professionals-offered their advice to disoriented communities, thus responding to an "expanding market for insight into social problems." 163 Comte's analysis brought to the fore not only human beings' tendency to specialize, but also its potential to harm. 164 No wonder, then, that (as we shall see below) Adams' work reflects Mill's suspicion of the commingling of professionalism and public control. Both seem to think that specialization and professionalization may very well be the rule of nature, but this does not mean that professionals should rule.
________________________________________________________________________
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Id. at 42. Comte believed that traditional forces of society were in decline and anticipated the rise of two new forces that would reign supreme: positivism and industrialism. Accordingly, his scheme of government was bifurcated into the spiritual and temporal authorities, which were to be mutually exclusive in terms of their respective powers. The first was to be composed of positive thinkers, while the latter of capitalists. There was no room for representative elements in this scheme. HIST. 494 (1978) . 163 HASKELL, supra note 31, at 199. Moreover, the end of the nineteenth century was the period of the rise of the great universities (and the decline of seminaries and theology) and professional philosophers (at the expense of "amateur men of letter"). See BRUCE KUKLICK, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA 1720 -2000 , at 97-110 (2001 . It was the time of the emergence of the "professional" social scientists, and the professionalization of various white collar occupations in a number of fields, such as medicine, law, pharmaceutical chemistry, accountancy, and social work. 
C. Herbert Spencer
We now turn to Spencer. A longer excursion into Spencer's system of thought is warranted for two reasons: first, for his unparalleled intellectual influence in America during the second half of the nineteenth century; and, second, because Spencer fell into such disfavor during the twentieth century that his work is practically unknown to most people today. 165 Spencer's influence in the United States during the second half of the nineteenth century cannot be exaggerated, as it surpassed even Darwin's impression on the American mind. As Hofstadter put it, "In the three decades after the Civil War it was impossible to be active in any field of intellectual work without mastering Spencer." 166 Spencer was endorsed by men with the highest business and academic credentials. Thus, as a notable example, William Graham Sumner, one of the greatest American sociologists, was an avid Spencerian and a strong believer in Social Darwinism. 167 So was the steel tycoon Andrew Carnegie. 168 The imprint of Spencer's robust individualism on the legal discourse of his time as well was made known by Justice Holmes' famous reprimand in Lochner that "the 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." 169 Holmes, needless to say, was also an admirer of Spencer. 170 It should be again noted that Spencer was audacious enough to propose that the past and future annals of the entire universe, literally speaking, from dust to flora and fauna to the planets to the human physique, psychology, and organizations, could be explained by a cycle of evolution and dissolution.
According to Spencer, the transition from one phase to the other is directed by shifts in the balance between motion and consolidation in a given system-the more movement there is, the less solidified the system is, and vice versa. A move in the first direction is evolutionary and in the second, dissolutionary: "[T]he general history of every aggregate is definable as a change from diffused imperceptible state, to a concentrated perceptible state and again to a diffused imperceptible state; every detail of the history is definable as a part of either the one change or the other. Furthermore, Spencer asserts that an evolutionary process involves a movement of specialization from homogeneity to heterogeneity, the latter being the more stable condition. "As we now understand it," Spencer writes, "Evolution is definable as a change from incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of motion and integration of matter."
173 Anything homogeneous is unstable, he argues, as its (standardized) parts are exposed to different pressures/forces (depending, for example, on their position in the system), and are therefore sure to develop differently. 174 This process brings about differentiation that produces, in turn, a heterogeneous and internally-dependent, thus stable, system. As noted, Spencer applied this principle not only to the organic world, but carried it also to the field of political theory.
175 A nice illustration for this train of thought, as applied to the business of railroading, was provided by Adams in a 1870 essay in which he made the following argument on the workings of the law of gravitation:
Just as the larger material body attracts in space the smaller,-just as development naturally leads to a more complex and yet to a more simple condition of being,-so our railroad system tends ever to consolidation, and that consolidation rapidly casts off old trammels, the fruitful source of discord, and result in a more elaborate and perfect organization.
176
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Id. at 308 (emphasis in original). While its thrust is captured in these comments, the process of evolution, as described by Spencer, is much more complex, of course. For example, it includes "secondary redistributions" or secondary cycles of evolutionary processes. See id. especially ch. 15. 173 Id. at 359.
174
To illustrate, Spencer writes with regard to the formation of planet Earth: "Were the conditions to which the surface of the Earth is exposed, alike in all directions, there would be no obvious reason why certain of its parts should become permanently unlike the rest. But being unequally exposed to the chief external centre of force-the Sun-its main divisions become equally modified: as the crust thickens and cools, there arises that contrast, now so decided, between the polar and equatorial regions." Id. 407. As noted, Spencer argued that the same dynamics are at play when it comes to protozoa and human associations. See id. 410 et seq. 175 This is the thrust of the argument: "With this advance from small incoherent social aggregations to great coherent ones, which, while becoming integrated pass from uniformity to multiformity, there goes an advance from indefiniteness of political organization to definiteness of political organization." SPENCER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY, supra note 57, at 733. The force of the argument is readily realized by the fact that Spencer prophetically predicted that on the political level the process would result in the formation of a "European federation," during a century when Europe was splintered by jealousies and strife. SPENCER, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 51, at 317. 176 Adams, Railway Problems, supra note 63, at 127.
Spencer is probably most renowned for his assured application of the laws of evolution on human socialization. 177 His elaborate scheme of social development cannot be outlined here. For our purposes, I believe it sufficient to touch upon Spencer's theory of the evolution of societies from "the military type," to "the industrial type," as outlined in The Principles of Sociology.
178
The military society is typified by status and fixed castes; it is a society rife with armed conflicts and governed by a despot. 179 Its tyrannical nature is reflected in the extensive and intrusive schemes of personal regulation, which mandate compulsory cooperation among members of society. 180 The industrial society, contrariwise, is ruled by a regime of contracts, namely, it is based on voluntary cooperation. 181 The post-military society is pacific. It is dedicated to the preservation of individual autonomy; it is in that sense "popular."
182 It seeks, and is required, to interfere with the lives of citizens to the least extent possible, 183 thus allowing for the natural flow of their personal evolution, which is mirrored in overall social evolution. 184 Spencer, an ardent Lamarckian, 185 was certain that the industrial society would produce better human beings, that is, independent, kind, and honest citizens who wouldand this may sound surprising-embrace altruism, but only out of choice.
186 Thus, as much as individualism must reign supreme, social order is not jeopardized, he insisted. On the contrary.
As surely as the tree becomes bulky when it stands alone, and slender if one of a group; as surely as a blacksmith's arms grown large . . .; as surely as a clerk acquires rapidity in writing and calculation; . . . -so surely must the human faculty be moulded into complete fitness for the social 190 What is left, then, for the government to do under this framework? This is the short answer: According to Spencer, the legitimate state should only "administer justice."
191 In other words, he argues that ideally the state should limit itself to resolving judicially disputes among individuals, a process which would diminish as members of society perfect their sense of justice with the progress of time. 192 Spencer reached this conclusion with reference to the familiar concept of the state of nature, and argued that men wanted government
[n]ot to regulate commerce; not to educate the people; not to teach religion; not to administer charity; not to make roads and railways; but simply to defend the natural rights of man-to protect person and property-to prevent the aggressions of the powerful upon the weak-in a word, to administer justice. This is the natural, the original, office of Id. See also SPENCER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY, supra note 57, at 745-746. Truth should be told that in some of his later work Spencer sounds less assured about the attainment of progress. While he remained convinced that the form political institutions would take in the future would be dependent on the persistence of peace for considerable periods of time, he admitted that he could not predict whether societies of the future would take a peaceful or belligerent attitude toward each other. Thus, at some point he wrote that "throughout approaching periods, everything would depend on the courses which societies happen to take in their behaviour to one another-courses which cannot be predicted." Id. at 736. This admission is not to be taken lightly, since, as we have seen, Spencer had originally stipulated a deterministic scheme with a clear end in sight: the production of a peaceful, liberal man befitting the industrial society. 189 See infra text accompanying notes 192-195. 190 See, e.g., SPENCER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY, supra note 57, at 724 ("Long ago it had ceased to be thought that Government could do any good by regulating people's food, clothes, and domestic habits . . . ."). Spencer generally predicted the decline in dominance of the executive branch in industrial societies and "the functions to be discharged by its occupant will become more and more automatic. 195 It seems that the reason for Spencer's visible hostility to a form of state regulation lay in his deep-seated Lamarckism. His fear was that such regulation would damage not only the constitution of the present generation but also that of the next, through the process of inheritance of acquired characteristics. 196 Particularly troubling from Spencer's perspective were various (quite minimal) social-welfare schemes undertaken in his time.
197 To Spencer, state regulation in general and this kind of regulation in particular was detrimental both to the recipients of state assistance and to those forced to sustain it.
198 Furthermore, running through the Spencer corpus is the conviction that administrative regulation invigorates the state at the expense of voluntary associations and at the price of the ossification of healthy, humane sentiments in society. 193 SPENCER, The Proper Sphere of Government, supra note 59, § 6.10. Later on Spencer spells out the institutional ramification of this prescription, when he stipulates that the state should "establish courts of justice, which should be easy of access, speedy in their decisions, and in which every man should be able to obtain the protection of the law, free of cost. " Id. § 6.97. 194 Id. § § 6.44-6.48. Spencer likewise argued that colonialism was an immoral enterprise for it entailed the expansion of governmental powers, benefited only "the monopolists" in the Western countries, and led to inhumane treatment of the colonized people. See id. § § 6.6.50-6.70. 195 See 2 ADAMS SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 184-185 (1776). As we know, John Locke was quite terse when directly addressing the issue of the role of government (thus triggering much controversy among future scholars). See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 2.135 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1689) (government has "no other end but preservation …"), and 6 JOHN LOCKE, WORKS 42 (1963 ) (1823 SPENCER, The Proper Sphere of Government, supra note 59, § 6.33 ("We are told that the sins of the wicked shall be visited upon the children to the third and fourth generation. That visitation may either exhibit itself in mental derangement, bodily disease, or temporal want. The parent may either transmit to the child bad moral tendencies, a constitutional taint, or may leave it in circumstances of great misery."). 197 See, e.g., SPENCER, The Coming Slavery, supra note 76, which is a diatribe against various "Poor Laws" and other forms of social-welfare legislation.
199
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Welfare policies wrong recipients of welfare benefits, who are thus unable to better themselves in the ruthless struggle for survival, but also the taxed population, which is denied the opportunity to organically develop humane sentiments towards others. See SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, supra note 187, at 205 ("[N] ature secures the growth of a race who shall both understand the conditions of existence, and be able to act up to them."); SPENCER, The Proper Sphere of Government, supra note 59, § 6.33 ("Adversity is, in many cases, the only efficient school for the transgressor."); and SPENCER, The Proper Sphere of Government, supra note 59, § 6.27 ("Forced contributions rarely appeal to kindly feelings . . . .").
199
See infra text accompanying note 226.
D. Evolution to Adams
"Evolution" could mean different things to different people in the nineteenth century.
200 Which option did Adams embrace? A good place to examine what "evolution" meant for him, before examining in detail what he took from it as he mulled over the railroad problem, is in his professed philosophy of history.
Throughout his life, the more so after his retirement from the railroad businesses, Adams saw himself as a historian. He lectured on topics in American history on various occasions in the United States and abroad and published a series of studies relating to Massachusetts and his family history. 201 So prominent was Adams' stature as a historian that, while the head of the Massachusetts Historical Society, he was invited to be the keynote speaker in the dedication ceremony of the building of Wisconsin's State Historical Society in mid-October 1900. 202 The address may be best characterized as progressive (or Reform) Darwinian, which is to say that it falls in line with key tenets in the thinking of Comte and, even more so, Spencer (neither of whom are mentioned by name in the address).
Adams presents a distinct interpretation of Darwin's work in outlining his own newfound philosophy of history. Revealing his superficial understanding of Darwin, he purports to import two arguments from Darwin, the first more warranted than the second: First, natural species are connected, rather than simply forming a chain of distinct, separate entities. The second argument is that species progressively evolve over time towards some ultimate end. 203 Likewise, Adams maintains that a historian should construct history so that it demonstrates these two movements, namely, to show how what may seem at first to be disorderly facts are actually connected to form a teleological structure. "To each development, each epoch, race and dynasty its proper place [is] to be assigned[]" Adams concludes his prescription for the new historians, "and to assign that place [is] the function of the historian."
204
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The review in the previous Parts did not exhaust, of course, the various understandings of evolution that circulated in Adams' time. Thus, for example, Thomas Henry Huxley, Darwin's greatest panegyric in Britain, is missing from the review. Huxley, who was a Reform Darwinist (see Hovenkamp, supra note 37), thought, for example, that the government should take an active role in the dissemination and acquisition of knowledge in society by financially supporting scientific research, accessible education, and the construction of libraries and museums. See, e.g., ADRIAN DESMOND, HUXLEY: FROM DEVIL'S DISCIPLE TO EVOLUTION'S HIGH PRIEST 166-167, 243-244 (1997) , and 1 THOMAS H. HUXLEY, Administrative Nihilism, in COLLECTED ESSAYS (1983-1894) (1880).
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KIRKLAND, supra note 8.
202
The address was later published. See Charles Francis Adams, The Sifted Grain and the Grain Sifters, 6 AM. HIST. REV. 197 (1901) [hereinafter Adams, Sifted Grain] .
203
This is a problematic characterization for post-Darwin Darwinism came to reject the notion of progressive evolution. See supra note 18. But see supra note 138. 204 Adams, Sifted Grain, supra note 202, at 199.
Adams writes as if he does not know where the train of history may lead. Yet he is certain the ride will prove to be worth the price of the ticket; he is certain that "the evolution of man [is] from a lower to a higher stage." 205 As noted, in so claiming, Adams unhesitatingly paints Darwinian evolution in clear progressive colors, something modern evolutionists would be reluctant to do, to put it mildly-unless, of course, they subscribed to the Spencerian system. Indeed, Adams' reasoning seems to follow the essentials of Spencer's principles more than any other single evolutionary thinker. He probably deemed Comte too authoritative, Darwin too open-ended, and Huxley too eager to intervene in the natural course of the civil society. The next Part will demonstrate several ways in which Adams' theory of regulation followed Spencer's theory of evolution.
IV. ON SOCIAL DARWINISM: SPENCERISM AND ADAMS
As I have argued throughout the Article, Spencer's theory provides coherence to Adams' theories that they otherwise lack. This Part is dedicated to substantiating that argument.
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A. Survival of the Fittest
As noted, it was Spencer who coined the principle of "the survival of the fittest." The proposed interpretation of the Adams corpus does not requires me to point at a smokinggun type of evidence which would resolutely attest to Adams' adherence to Spencerism/Social Darwinism/etc. (But see supra note 147). Rather, as this Article is engaged in contextual intellectual history, it is predicated on the understanding that the intellectual climate within which Adams pondered on the railroad problem must have influenced his theories, whether Adams would concede this or not (without denying that Adams had considerable discretion in molding his theories REV. 879 (1987) . Tellingly, Adams stated on one occasion that his model of regulation, as had been adopted by the State of Massachusetts, was the result of "nothing but a happy guess . . . ." (Cullom Committee Rep., Test. P. 1202). The methodology of this Article argues that, given the intellectual atmosphere in Massachusetts at the time, it was no accident that Adams' "happy guess" bore the imprints of the evolutionary thinking of the day. On the intellectual environment of Adams' time, see generally BRUCE KUKLICK, THE RISE OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY: CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 1860 -1930 (1977 whose victory is therefore wholly justified 209 and absolutely needed for the forward march of society's progressive evolution. 210 Adams used the phrase repeatedly when he spoke of the railroad industry.
211 He, as many others at the time, thought contending lines were engaged in "predatory competition." 212 As noted, Adams' age witnessed "competition with a vengeance and the inauguration of a species of commercial warfare of a magnitude and violence unheralded in economic history." 213 In that context Spencer's phraseology must have appeared particularly inviting. As we have seen, Adams not only employed the phrase, but was also willing to draw the necessary conclusion from it: To him, the losing ("unfit") party must perish.
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B. The Power of Concentration
In one of his appeals to his fellow Bostonians, Adams explained why a commission would be more suitable an investigator of the railroad problem than any individual: "Wielding all the influence of a community, having every source of information thrown open to them, such officials [i.e., commission members] become the recipients of light from all quarters, and can, if they be competent, concentrate the scattered rays into a powerful focus." 215 As noted, in a democracy, however, this was easier said than done because of "the difficulty of concentrating as one force all possible forms of mind and phases of interest[] . . . amid the ebbs and floods of a democratic form of government . . . ."
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As suggested in the text, today it is indeed widely held that the phrase "the survival of the fittest" is tautological. See Matthew K. Chew & Manfred D. Laubichler, Natural Enemies-Metaphor or Misconception?, 301 SCI. 52 (2003) . 210 It has been long noticed that Spencer attempts to reconcile between a thoroughly individualistic worldview, which centers around individuals' natural rights, and an organicist conception of society, which posits the precedence of the collective over the individual. Many have argued that Spencer failed to reconcile the two, but there have been other, more favorable views on the issue. For an overview of the debate and one such attempt of reconciliation, see T. S. Gray, Herbert Spencer: Individualist or Organicist?, 33 POL. STUD. 236 (1985) .
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To take one relevant example, the phrase "the survival of the fittest" recurs in comments made by Adams and by members of the Cullom Committee throughout the former's testimony in front of the Committee. See, e.g., Cullom Committee Rep., Test. Pp. 1204 ("[pooling] is an attempt on the part of the railroads to hold in check a natural law which would result in the survivalship of the fittest."), 1209, & 1213. 212 Supra note 38. 213 Tipple, supra note 33, at 27. 214 See supra text accompanying notes 91-92 and note 86. 215 Adams, Boston II, supra note 8, at 558. 216 Adams, Boston I, supra note 8, at 15.
Illustrative is the fact that in an earlier article, Adams, speaking of the movement toward centralization in the newspaper business, wrote, "The newspaper press is the engine of modern education; and that press, obeying the laws of gravitation, is everywhere centralized,-the rays of light once scattered are concentrated into one allpowerful focus." 217 It seems, then, that Adams reverted to the idea of concentration (and focus) to convey an image of regulation as a confluence of forces dedicated to one goal; it was a conception of regulation as a prism through which a concentrated communal activity could be made effective. Hence, Adams had this to say of his Massachusetts Board of Railroads Commissioners, " [It] was set up as a sort of lens by means of which the otherwise scattered rays of public opinion could be concentrated to a focus and brought to bear upon a given point." 218 Thus viewed, regulation was conceived of as a natural part of the modern movement of "gravitation of the parts to the centre,-toward the combination and concentration of forces [.] " 219 Just as railroads were drawn to combinations, 220 so, on the other side, regulatory boards would concentrate public "forces." In that sense, regulation was portrayed as a modern phenomenon. The analogy made between public regulation and journalism suggested the remedy proposed by Adams to the railroad problem-i.e., information. The process, it was emphasized, was inevitable. "We must follow out the era on which we have entered to its logical and ultimate conclusion, for it was useless for men to stand in the way of the steam-engines." "No human power," he concluded, "can stop it."
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As we have seen, Adams-following Mill's analysis of Comte-had ample reason to resent this outcome for he feared centralization would stifle personal freedom. 222 The way he designed the Massachusetts Board might have been the result of this resentment.
C. Remedies in an Age of Evolution
Speaking of the Massachusetts Board of Railroads Commissioners, Adams noted with satisfaction, "Undesignedly the Massachusetts legislators had rested their law on the one great social feature which distinguishes modern civilization from any other of which we have a record,-the eventual supremacy of an enlightened public opinion." "That secured," he proclaimed, "all else might safely be left to take its own course." 223 This proposition takes us back to Adams' intentional refusal to endow the Board with any See supra text accompanying note 86. 221 Adams, The Railroad System, supra note 48, at 495. Adams reasoned in a different context that "[p]eople may say, and legislators may enact, what they please; the stern logic of taxation will at last convince us that that there is a science of revenue." Adams was certain that there would be a time when the laws of this science worked their way "through the pockets into the heads of the people." Adams, Boston II, supra note 8, at 590. Adams reiterated this deterministic message when he appeared in front of the Cullom Committee. See Cullom Committee Rep., Test. Pp. 1208 -1209 & 1211 See supra text accompanying notes 47 & 161. 223 ADAMS, RAILROADS, supra note 35, at 140, 215 coercive powers. It was left for Massachusettians to pull the chestnuts out of the fire, based on the results of the Board's investigation, should they choose to do so.
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Framing the issue in Spencerian terms is instructive. Being a classical liberal, Spencer adheres to the private/public division, 225 and provides it with a seemingly naturalistic, evolutionary "explanation." To him, one of the manifestations of the rivalry between the man and the state is the "fact" that the more vital the private sphere becomes, the slimmer the chances of the public sphere are to survive, and vice versa. Spencer warns against "State-usurpation of all industries," a result that might follow from a dynamics where "the private forms . . . , disadvantaged more and more in competition with the State . . . will more and more die away . . . ."
226 Namely, as long as regulation thrives, there is little hope that some (non-governmental) agent will emerge to carry the awesome task of derailing society from its road to mediocrity and decay. Put in contemporary terms, Spencer points to the upshots of the logic of collective action, as he points out that the state is better organized than dispersed individuals and private organization.
227 Additionally, he argues that the state can "arrange everything for its own convenience . . . ."
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According to his own account, Adams faced a reality where there was a chance that private corporations would evolutionarily emerge to predominate society.
229 Now, as a true believer in the public/private division, 230 he-like Spencer-could not recommend counteracting this development by investing the state with more power, for that meant further stifling liberty. Nor could Adams stand idle in the face of this contingency. His only option was to turn to the public.
In putting the emphasis on the public, Adams offered a correction to Spencer. For Adams realized only too well that in the emerging industrial economy, the private sphere can be as threatening to private liberty as the state. At the same time, the remedy Adams suggested-essentially, publicity and the spread of information-was purely Spencerian, for Adams' objective was merely to create the minimal conditions necessary for every
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In 1870 he accordingly censured an early proposal to found a national railroad commission for " [i] SPENCER, The Coming Slavery, supra note 76, at 39. Furthermore, under these conditions, decay spreads through the civil society and its ability to resist the state apparatus further diminishes. Id. at 33 ("Increasing power of a growing administrative organization is accompanied by decreasing power of the rest of the society to resist its further growth and control.").
229
See supra text accompanying note 47. 230 See supra text accompanying note 94.
"able" person to freely evolve, if she so chooses. Put differently, Adams, like Spencer, was concerned with allowing the "right" public to benefit from evolution. He therefore appealed to the right men, that is, to an educated, knowledgeable, intelligent public that truly cared about social issues and could be trusted to take part in the betterment of society. 231 For that reason, information played such an important role in his scheme of regulation. I would further argue that, in making his appeal, Adams depended on men cast in his image. I will return to both arguments below.
D. On the Importance of Scientific Investigation
Adams was certain that a scientific study of vexing social problems by specialized advisory bureaus was essential to successful tackling of such problems in a democratic society. However, as we shall now see, Adams' grasp of the scientific methodology and of scientificity was rather crude.
Consider Adams' description of the procedure employed by a commission "of scientific men" that had been formed by the Boston gentry to study the ailments of the city's harbor. "They went quietly to work," he reported in 1868 in an admiring tone, "and studied currents, measured canals, [and] observed the tidal flood."
232 Only then did they present their conclusions for the consideration of their fellow citizens. By endorsing this method of investigation, Adams indicated that the true mission of the commissions of his design was to serve as public tribunals for the evaluation of disputed data.
Yet at the same time, Adams expected this public tribunal, at the completion of its data-collection, would provide the community, "with laws ascertained, [and] with a system defined." 233 This seamless leap from quantitative facts to the laws of reality and, more doubtful still, to normative conclusions is a remarkable sleight-of-hand commonly performed by reform-minded thinkers.
234 "Whatever is attempted," Adams commented with regard to Boston's ossified channels of trade, "let it be attempted knowingly and systematically, in obedience to some natural law." 235 To the question of the genealogy or authorship of these laws he paid no attention. His assumption seems to have been that a gifted fact-finder would have no trouble observing the natural law configuring the collected data. He expected that the underlying law would loom large for all objective viewers to see.
It is hard to pigeonhole neatly Adams' pronouncements into any one school in the philosophy of science. They surely leaned toward positivism that was developed by Comte and later refined by Rudolf Carnap, among others. PROCESS (1938) , which is critically analyzed in Sagy, The Manager, The Judge, and the Empiricist, supra note 15, ch. 6. 235 Adams, Boston II, supra note 8, at 591. 236 See RUDOLF CARNAP, THE UNITY OF SCIENCE 21-29 (1934) . On positivism and scientific realism, see generally IAN HACKING, REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING (1983) ; DAVID J. HESS, SCIENCE specifically with regard to Spencer's methodology, "Spencer's deliberate simplicity and reliance on description was a thesis in itself; it demonstrated that portrayal of structure and function exhausted the need for explanation; it was all of Life that could be examined. In lieu of inner drives or archetypes, the shape of organism became the sole evidence for the meaning of Life."
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Heed well the assumption undergirding this methodology, at least in Spencer: The "is" equals the "ought"; reality manifests what should be. 238 Spencer is well aware of the fact that, when it comes to human affairs, current reality may not manifest the "ought." This may be so for various reasons, mainly society's shortsightedness (for which it pays a heavy penalty).
239 However, Spencer is certain that in the future, following inevitable natural processes, reality will be aligned with the "ought"; eventually, he is certain "[n]ature will be obeyed."
240 As can be easily seen, Spencer's is a tautological methodology (what ought to become is the "right" reality, that is, the reality that ought to come into being). Later commentators would challenge this approach and expose its shaky footings.
241 This is a complex philosophical subject that need not detain us here. Suffice it to point out that "nature" (or "Life") does not present itself "directly," as it were, to the observer, but rather always through a conceptual grid.
242 Interestingly enough, Adams seems to have been well aware of this fact-of-life. His 1876 article dedicated to a close examination of the statistics of railroad death-and injury-rate in the U.S. and Europe was a testament to the great difficulty in comparing such data-even though the data should have "simply" recorded the number of people hurt as a result of railroad operations. In this context Adams offered the following clarification: "The great difficulty . . . of comparing the results deduced from equally complete statistics of ________________________________________________________________________ STUDIES: AN ADVANCED INTRODUCTION 8-14, 30-34 (1997); and SIMON BLACKBURN, TRUTH: A GUIDE 109-128 (2005 OF VIEW 20 (2d ed. rev., 1980) , and ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 79-81 (2d ed., 1984) . 242 See NOVICK, supra note 206, e.g., at 1-2. Future scientists (especially quantum physicists) and philosophers of science would come to doubt these propositions; some would demonstrate the ideological commitments evinced by such claims of objectivity. See sources cites supra note 241. different countries[] lies in the variety of the arbitrary rules under which the computations in making them are affected." 243 The fact that both Spencer and Adams adhere to a positivist methodology is significant for at least two reasons: (1) This methodology assumes that all the regulator/scientist needs to do in order to fulfill her duties is to collect scrupulously the ("right") facts. It thus turns out that the scientific methodology underlying the Adams' and Spencer's thinking on regulation supports their non-interventionist political philosophy.
(2) The methodology rests on very strong assumptions about the profile of regulators (and scientists) and about their work: their (alleged) impeccable cognitive and intellectual abilities as well as steadfast adherence to ("the right") moral values; the belief in attainable objectivity and the possibility of ideology-less inquiry of social (and natural) phenomena. 244 It follows again that Adams must have had quite a specific vision of the ideal regulator in his mind in prescribing a positivist regulatory methodology. The next Section will pursue this hypothesis further.
E. The Man Regulator
The last remark takes us to another element in Adams' model of regulation that should be fleshed out, namely, its ambivalence towards professionalism.
As noted, Adams' age saw the rising prestige of professionals in general in society. This process was accompanied by greater emphasis on adequate training, rigorous methodology, and objectivity in their practice. 245 As we have also seen, Adams above all valued objectivity and careful methodology. Still, he was apparently reluctant to make professionalism a prerequisite to commissionership. Comte's work (especially as interpreted by Mill) might provide a clue as to what led Adams to this position. Comte's description of the evolution of human thought was a happy tale of growing professionalization in Western society. Mill's critique countered that, taken too far, this trend might result in despotism.
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Professionalization of regulation could mean that only railroad executives or engineers would be deemed competent to serve on a railroad commission. Following Mill, this result might have turned a progressive development (the introduction of advisory commissions) into a regressive instrument if professionalism had been allowed to reign supreme. I would argue that Adams proposed to avert this danger by shifting the ________________________________________________________________________ MODERN WORLD 197 (1997 ) (1925 ("professionalised knowledge . . . produces minds in a groove.").
emphasis from certified professionalism to highly regarded social standing. He insisted on the selection of society's best, that is, those who had already proven their commitment to "the" public interest, whatever their profession might be. He was able to do so, inter alia, in reliance on his preferred scientific methodology. As we have just seen, one did not have to go through a certain certified professional training to command the methodology of inquiry prescribed by Adams to his idea commissioner. Thus, Adams was able to proclaim, "All in such cases depends upon the men." 247 Professionalization of regulation might bring about another regrettable result from Adams' point of view: the disqualification of people like himself from serving on commissions. To put it bluntly, one might reasonably argue that, in advancing the view that "[a]ll . . . depends upon the men," Adams is essentially telling his audience: "I and my peers are 'the men.'" This was plainly the case with Adams, who, when his proposed legislation was debated in the Massachusetts legislature in 1869, "actively pursued the commission post by asking influential friends to intercede on his behalf." 248 Adams eventually succeeded in acquiring the coveted position. His run for the commission tells us something about his perception of the experience needed for the job. After all, he was at the time "a man of thirty-four who had tested personal success only in the fleeting context of military glory" during the Civil War. 249 An astute, opinionated, and thoroughly-informed student of the railroad business as he was, he had little to show for it, if only because of his age.
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So we are left with Adams as the persona grata. Indeed, if there was one thing, it seems, that Charles Francis Adams could successfully vouch for, it was his social standing and reputation. In the end, to him, a would-be commissioner's prior education and financial achievements, or, just as important, previous knowledge of the regulated ________________________________________________________________________ 247 industry, were much less consequential. 251 This way of thinking was not at all alien to Adams' contemporaries, as shown by his brother, Henry. "Down to 1850, and even later," relates Henry Adams, "New England society was still directed by the professions [,] [l]awyers, physicians, professors, merchants." However, he goes on to say, when it came to politics, "the system required competent expression; it was the old Ciceronian idea of government between the best . . . ."
252 Given his illustrious pedigree, Adams could be safely, and had every reason to be, considered one of Boston's best.
F. Adams and Spencer: Conclusion
Similar to a great many liberals nowadays, Adams saw himself as caught between the Scylla of unbridled economic giantism, which might bring about a situation where the "individual will . . . be engrafted on the corporation," 253 and the Charybdis of centralized government violating the dicta that government should be parsimoniously structured. As this Part has demonstrated, putting the dilemma in these terms carries with it certain ideological baggage. Before moving to the next Part, which is dedicated to connecting Adams to the present, I wish to bring to the fore two components in the Spencer-Adams ideological baggage.
The first point is salient. The Spencerian system is premised on the notions that life is a struggle for survival and that, therefore, it should be ordered as a struggle for the survival of the fittest. 254 Ergo, it seems to follow that it is advisable to put minimal government in place. Adams certainly endorsed this conclusion. 255 However, there is nothing "natural," of course, in this conclusion, even if one subscribes to a progressive evolutionary theory. The abysmal gap between Comte's and Spencer's political outlooks-and the range of possibilities lying between them-should serve as conclusive evidence to the following simple fact: there was never a simple, "logical," nonideological way to translate evolutionary thinking into social policies.
The second point is more subtle, but just as important. As devised by Adams, his "non-interventionist" regulatory mechanism enhanced the submission and re-submission of (the same) one group in society to the (same) other group of society-the latter being the group of society's "best."
256 As a result, Adams' model enshrined a regime inimical to social mobility. Thus, we find Adams, in what could easily characterized as a
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See similarly EASTMAN, supra note 247, at 376. ("It is not necessary for the members of the tribunals to be technical experts on the subject matter of their administration. As a matter of fact, you could not find a man who is a technical expert on any large part of the matters upon which the [ICC] finds it necessary to pass.").
252
HENRY ADAMS, supra note 206, at 32 (emphasis in original). Robert Cushman writes apropos of the history of the ICC, "Impartiality, or at least neutrality, was looked upon as more important than expertness." It was "honesty and fairness" which were believed to be "so essential to adequate railroad regulation." CUSHMAN, supra note 13, at 63.
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Supra note 47. 254 See, e.g., SPENCER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY, supra note 57, at 698 ("the final survival and spread must be on the part of those societies which produce the largest number of the best individualsindividuals best adapted for life in industrial state."). 255 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 223.
256
Supra note 252.
"progressive" article, 257 calling upon the railroad corporations to create "[r]ailroad educational institutions": "The children of employees would naturally go into these schools, and the best of them would . . . be sent out upon the road to take their places in the shops, on the track, or at the brake." 258 Adams held on to such conservative views in an era pregnant with potential for social change, inter alia, thanks to the advent of modern evolutionism. Since, if we follow Adams' and Spencer's logic, the fittest are the ones destined to emerge triumphant from the competition for survival at the expense of society's lesser individuals whose lower "credentials" predestined them to oblivion. This is a recipe for social stagnation. This conclusion was realized by none other than Spencer himself, who said, "For however great the degree of evolution reached by an industrial society, it cannot abolish the distinction between the superior and inferior-the regulators and the regulated . . .
[nor] the difference between those whose characters and abilities raise them to the higher positions, and those who remain in the lower."
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V. THE "REINVENTION" OF REGULATION: WHY ADAMS? WHY NOW?
It is time to go back to Adams' future, namely, to the reinvention revolution: As noted, that revolution was the result of a growing sense among friends and foes of regulation that traditional models of regulation were not working well enough. Consequently, it was widely held that its legitimacy was eroding. 260 As a result of this critical discourse, the last generation of regulation has witnessed an obsessive discussion of novel models of regulation that aspire to break loose of the (perceived) constrains of traditional models of regulation. 261 This critical debate, in turn, has had a real effect on the regulatory landscape. This was made apparent by the innumerable novel regulatory strategies put forward in the past twenty years or so 262 -several of which will be discussed presently. But before we get down to the details, it should be noted again that the many resulting novel strategies are said to usher in a "new paradigm" of regulation.
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It is difficult to generalize about this abundance. Tentatively trying its hand at it, a recent survey 264 divided many of the novel strategies into two main groups: (1) strategies that seek to further pluralist and participatory interest in regulatory settings by advocating government-stakeholder networks; 265 and (2) those that focus on laying out "economic incentives systems." 266 Yet, as indicated at the outset of this study, I believe that a closer examination of these new models reveals that several key elements of the Adams legacy are clearly echoed in the "reinvention revolution." Indeed, I believe that some of the regulatory practices that belong in that "revolution" were already put forward by Adams in the latenineteenth century. This Part highlights the striking similarities between these novel strategies of regulation, especially network models, and the Adams model of the late nineteenth century. In other words, it argues that the "old" (Adams) model and the new (network) models of regulation share key theoretical and operational principals, to be outlined in the ensuing discussion.
A. The Regulator as a Facilitator
I begin with the role of the regulator in the regulatory state. To recall, for Adams, the regulator has two main responsibilities: first, the collection and processing of information; and second, providing the public with a suitable arena where communal energies can be focused on the attainment of public goods. 267 A similar attitude permeates theories of the reinvention campaign of the last generation, where the regulator is no longer perceived as a professional, expert public official, who is separated from the public and whose main task is to command-and-control, but rather as a facilitator of public action. 268 This shift is informed by a pluralistic-democratic ethos that envisions the various segments composing a political community-the state, market, and the civil society-as forming one integrated entity.
269 Accordingly, regulatory processes are no longer designed primarily for the hierarchical, unilateral ordering of society (by regulators), but rather for multilateral resolution of social problems. 270 The idea that a regulator's responsibility includes the promotion of responsible local, on-the-ground, grassroots regulatory initiatives is commonly known as "orchestration."
271 Under this vision, the regulator should create a legal environment which is conducive to the (organic) budding of a variety of local practices, so that she will eventually be able to pick, choose, and support those practices that prove to be more successful.
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B. Regulation-Through-Information and Self-Regulation
One of the main tools a regulator-as-orchestrator uses in Adams' weak model is the collection of information. As so often noted, Adams thought that an essential preliminary to any regulatory action was the systematic collection of information. 273 But even more than that, we have seen that the orderly collection of information was, to Adams, the essence of the regulatory activity. This emphasis in his thinking was best captured in Adams' advocacy of the establishment of "bureaus of railroad statistics" 274 that would collect, analyze, and publicize information about the railroad industry. Herein lay the key to successful regulation; indeed, the key to regulation.
Turning to the present, one can observe that a similar consumer-protectionist agenda, coupled with a pluralist, civil-republican 275 sentiment, have likewise triggered a spate of "information-forcing" policies. 276 The idea here is that the surfacing of information is an essential vehicle to facilitate educated public discussions on the burning issues of the day-discussions that should result in multi-party social agreements on the management of these issues. 277 Accordingly, the end-of-the-twentieth century saw the advent of new "kinds" of legal regimes whose tool of regulation was indeed only information, 278 just as Adams had envisioned. At the core of "the information revolution" is the imposition of duties to collect and publicize information on both private and public bodies. 279 Apart from the more traditional strategies, whose primary goal is to (directly) facilitate informed consumer choice, there are other regulatory information-generating strategies, whose aim is to trigger self-reflexive processes within the regulated industry. A whole group of regulatory strategies, which go by the telling name of reflexive regulation, are included in this category. 280 Reflexive law largely refrains from directly ordering regulatees' conduct, often contenting itself with offering information-disclosure mechanisms. Its aim is the promotion of business internalization of desirable social goals to be translated into responsible business behavior. 281 Crucially important for our purpose, its means is information, and its aim is self-policing and self-regulation. 282 Self-regulation relates to Adams' theory of weak regulation in more than one respect. For it is not only its reliance on information but also the fact that it is based on private, rather than public, enforcement mechanisms that makes it a modern incarnation of the Adams model. Adams made it a cardinal rule of faith in his teachings that regulatory bodies would refrain from the use of coercive power. 283 Likewise, a common thread running through contemporary literature on regulation is a reluctance to use the state's coercive power to bring about social welfare. This is made readily apparent when we compare the brave new world described in the last few paragraphs to the world of the command-and-control. 284 Reflexive law provides an excellent illustration. It clearly limits the role of government in the overall process of social regulation, as do-maybe to a lesser extent-other contemporary examples, such as performance-based regulation and management-based regulation. 285 Adams, I believe, would have approved of many of these options. As we have seen, he believed that the state's non-coercive position would enable commissioners to enjoy the confidence of both the industry and the public. He thought, in other words, that this position was vital for the legitimacy, and thus the success, of the regulatory endeavor.
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In hindsight, Adams could be commended for realizing early on that market regulation would normally face the fierce opposition of the industry. The power held by railroad barons must have instilled this understanding in his mind, as he took his first steps in the regulatory arena. Mid-twentieth century commentators would famously build impressive theories of capture and commissions' life cycles whose point-of-departure would be this simple understanding, namely, that regulation was normally done in a hostile environment. 287 Later commentators would complement capture critiques with the abovementioned pluralist critiques of regulation. What is worth emphasizing in this latter critique in the present context is its argument that top-down regulation erodes public legitimacy. 288 Others would put the emphasis on top-down regulation's inefficiencies-a leading argument here was that hierarchical regulation was insensitive to the peculiarities of local circumstances and therefore rigid and expensive. 289 Taken together, these various strands of critique nicely correspond to Adams' fervent belief in the illegitimacy of coercive, centralized, top-down regulation. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 1, at 3 ("Regulation is currently under attack from all quarters as inefficient, ineffective, and undemocratic."), and Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 2, at 447 ("In addition to undermining the efficacy of regulation, the proliferation of rigid and unresponsive controls undermines the legitimacy of regulation in the eyes of the regulated community and impairs regulatory accountability."). 289 
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Finally, as noted, self-regulation in particular but also other forms of regulationthrough-information ascribe a minimal role to the state in market regulation. To repeat, these schemes of regulation ask the state merely to see to it that information is generated with the expectation that once information is exposed either internal, reflexive processes would be set in motion or external pressures would be unleashed; either way, exposure of previously undisclosed data is believed to create the conditions for setting a possibly beneficial chain reaction in motion. Either way, the state's sole job is to incentivize information exposure. Adams would be delighted.
C. Regulation-Through-Networking
Next, government-stakeholder network strategies share important operational elements with the Adams model. The various pluralist/participatory models of regulation included in this category 290 also grew out of the abovementioned critique of traditional, top-down, command-and-control regulation. It argues that government should foster the creation of government-stakeholder networks that would challenge hierarchical, onedirectional regulation. Contrarily, these networks would encompass a wide variety of government and non-government (e.g., business and civil-society) stakeholders in an effort to harness all relevant parties to the solution of specific public ailments, with the hope that the various parties would combine their respective knowledge and experience. Ideally, such networks would cooperatively set the solution and overview its implementation. The resulting regulatory process is purported to be much more flexible than command-and-control regulation. 291 Just as important, all-government and nongovernment parties-are literally regarded as stakeholders and all are expected to-and, according to sympathetic commentators, do 292 -take an active role in the regulatory process. The public is thus transformed from a passive object of regulation to a normgenerating subject. 293 Lastly, the products of a network-styled regulatory process could and should not be tailored in a "one-size-fit-all" manner. Rather, the end-results of the process may take the shape of flexible procedures or general outlines of desirable solutions. 294 In any event, they are a far cry from formal sanction imposed unilaterally from the top down.
Important similarities exist between the Adams model and the network approach.
295
. For one thing, both emphasize the need to base regulation on productive cooperation between government, business, and other constituencies. For another, both construct regulatory endeavors as fora in which government does not rely on its coercive powersbut rather on its power to persuade. In conclusion, both the Adams and the network approaches share a similar vision with regard to both spatial (regulation is done ________________________________________________________________________
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To repeat, the sizeable literature on "new governance" is included in the present category. See supra notes 265. 291 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 1. 292 
See id.
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See Lobel, supra note 7, at 373 ("Renew Deal governance is a regime based on engaging multiple actors and shifting citizens from passive to active roles."). 294 See, e.g., Trubek & Trubek, supra note 272. 295 Mainly, I think, because this approach may require government to play a substantial role in the actual carrying out of the regulatory remedy as devised by the network.
horizontally rather than vertically) and remedial dimensions of regulation (argumentation instead of coercion).
D. A Weak State
Finally, the role of the state: True, the different network strategies do not necessarily share an identical vision of the state, nor do they openly carry the banner of small government (as did Adams). Still, as pointed out by various commentators, 296 they inescapably advocate a vision of regulation in which government is de facto downsized. It seems that many network strategy principles "dilute," as it were, the role of government in the regulatory process. Reference may be made, in support of this argument, to the following network model traits: cultivation of business-public-government partnerships; preference given to local, tailor-made solutions over standardization; promotion of "soft law."
297 All these and others, so the argument goes, advocate a new division of labor between the government and the public, where the private side of the equation is expected to aggrandize its role in the regulatory process at the expense of the state. Bringing Adams back to the discussion, one is tempted to say that whether they willed or meant it or not, the promoters of network-style models of regulation conjure up a regulatory universe in which government is expected to do what Adams expected the government of his time to do, which is very little. On an even more abstract level, we can argue that the primary goals of regulation are shared by Adams, the network approach, and economic incentive systems. These shared goals are, (a) the promotion of an environment that is beneficial to the emergence of dispersed, local, private initiatives to tackle pressing social problems; and (b) the orchestration among such initiatives.
298 Note, again, that under these visions, state regulation co-exists with robust private regulation-and the former is not necessarily superior to the latter in terms of expediency.
299 Under these visions, state regulation is normally superior to private ordering (only) in its ability to coordinate among different sectors of the market. See Lobel, supra note 7, e.g., at 400. 299 See Hovenkamp, supra note 37. 300 See Lobel, supra note 7, e.g., at 403.
